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We empirically assess whether a usually expected negative response of private consumption 
and private investment to a fiscal consolidation is reversed. We focus on a large sample of 174 
countries between 1970 and 2018. We also employ three alternative measures of the Cyclically 
Adjusted Primary Balance used to determine fiscal episodes: i) the IMF-WEO based; ii) the 
HP-based; and iii) the Hamilton (2018)-based. We find that: i) increases in government 
consumption have a Keynesian effect on real per capita private consumption; ii) there is a 
positive effect of tax increases on private consumption when there is a fiscal consolidation; iii) 
there is a crowding-in effect for private investment, from fiscal contractions. Moreover, 
expansionary fiscal consolidations occur particularly in highly indebted advanced economies 
following an increase in taxes. Finally, the negative effect of taxation on private consumption 
is larger when an economy is experiencing a financial crisis but it is not consolidating. 
 
JEL: C23, E21, E62, H5, H62 
Keywords: non-Keynesian effects, fiscal consolidation, filtering, consumption, investment, 
financial crises, panel data, endogeneity 
  
                                                          
* This work was supported by the FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia) [grant numbers 
UID/ECO/00436/2019 and UID/SOC/04521/2019]. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily reflect those of the authors’ employers. Any remaining errors are the authors’ sole responsibility. 
$ ISEG – School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa; REM – Research in Economics and 
Mathematics, UECE. UECE – Research Unit on Complexity and Economics is supported by Fundação para a 
Ciência e a Tecnologia. email: aafonso@iseg.lisboa.pt  
# ISEG – School of Economics and Management; REM – Research in Economics and Mathematics, UECE – 
Research Unit on Complexity and Economics, University of Lisbon, Portugal. email: jalves@iseg.ulisboa.pt  
 Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão (ISEG), Universidade de Lisboa, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 Lisboa, 
Portugal. Research in Economics and Mathematics (REM) and Research Unit on Complexity and Economics 
(UECE), ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, Rua Miguel Lupi 20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal. Economics for Policy 
and Centre for Globalization and Governance, Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de 
Lisboa, Rua da Holanda 1, 2775-405 Carcavelos, Portugal. IPAG Business School, 184 Boulevard Saint-Germain, 





The COVID-19-led-recession is bringing again into the limelight the question of fiscal 
episodes and the importance of the so-called expansionary fiscal consolidations. Indeed, while 
several institutions and economists argued during the last Global Financial Crisis for the 
importance of fiscal stimuli in that context, the case for fiscal retrenchment, which via 
expectations, promotes more private demand and growth, surfaced in the discussion in the 
aftermath of that crisis. Now, history is revisited and to mitigate adverse consequences of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, all governments increased their spending in 2020, with advanced 
economies spending substantially more than developing counties. With falling revenues, this 
has meant a significant widening of fiscal deficits globally. As these deficits are not sustainable, 
fiscal adjustment in the post-COVID-19 period is inevitable. In this paper, we revisit the debate 
on the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy and assess the existence of expansionary fiscal 
consolidation episodes private consumption and private investment. 
We contribute to the literature by applying two filtering techniques to determine the so-called 
fiscal episodes: the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (that suffers from the identification of spurious 
cycles, inter alia) and the Hamilton (2018) alternative filtering method. We employ this strategy 
to circumvent potential issues linked to the common use of the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB), as readily available from publicly available sources. In this context, a change 
of a considerable magnitude in the CAPB would usually flag the existence of a fiscal episode. 
In addition, we also employ the IMF’s WEO CAPB measure for comparison and completeness 
purposes, although its use constrains the country-time coverage. 
Looking at a panel of  37 advanced economies and 137 developing economies over the 1970-
2018 period, we empirically test whether the usually expected negative response of private 
consumption (and investment) to a fiscal consolidation is reversed. Such event can arise if, for 
instance, consumers and investors might anticipate future benefits stemming from current fiscal 
consolidations with an increase in permanent income, allowing then private consumption (and 
investment) to increase. 
We find that: i) an increase in general government final consumption expenditure has a 
positive (Keynesian) effect on real per capita private consumption; ii) a rise in social transfers 
positively affects consumption; iii) there is a positive effect of increases in tax revenue on per 
capita consumption when a fiscal consolidation is taking place; iv) we find evidence of a 
crowding-in effect for private investment stemming from fiscal retrenchment episodes; v) the 
effects are mostly significant for advanced economies rather than for developing ones; vi) 
expansionary fiscal consolidations occur particularly in highly indebted advanced economies 
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following an increase in taxes ; vii) the negative effect of taxation on private consumption is 
larger when an economy is experiencing a financial crisis but it is not consolidating.. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature. 
Section 3 elaborates on the analytical framework to identify the fiscal episodes and presents 
key stylized facts. Section 4 empirically assesses the effects of fiscal adjustments on private 
consumption and private investment and conducts several robustness checks. The last section 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The discussion of expansionary fiscal consolidations can be traced back to Feldstein (1982), 
who argued that when permanent public spending cuts are seen as an indication of future tax 
cuts, expectations of permanent income increases.1 Thus, if a serious/credible fiscal 
consolidation occurs, there may be an induced wealth effect, leading to an increase in private 
consumption. On the other hand, lower government borrowing requirements decrease the risk 
premium associated with government debt, contributing to reduce real interest rates, and 
allowing the crowding-in of private investment2. However, if consumers do not think that a 
given fiscal consolidation is serious/credible, then the usual negative Keynesian effect on 
consumption will occur.3  
Against this background, an empirical analysis conducted by Cavallari and Romano (2017) 
has supported the fiscal predictability as a condition to prevent the crowding-out phenomena. 
A credible and anticipated fiscal policy helps agents to formulate rational expectations 
supporting a Ricardian behaviour. In fact, expectations play an important role on the success of 
fiscal consolidations. Heterogeneous expectations among individuals on the beliefs about the 
success and on the manner that governments consolidate public finances, can lead to an 
improvement in fiscal positions or, on the other hand, can exacerbate the detrimental effects on 
government public accounts (Hommes et al., 2018)4. Moreover, Lemoine and Lindé (2016) also 
demonstrated the impact of imperfect credibility effects on the degree of success of fiscal 
                                                          
1 Blanchard (1990), Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999) mentioned that with high debt ratios there is a higher 
probability of fiscal policy being non-Keynesian.  
2 As noticed in Escolano et al. (2018), as fiscal adjustments tend not to reduce debt ratio - governments tend to 
slowing down fiscal adjustment pace with debt-to-GDP stabilization –, it is found that expansionary monetary 
policy is fundamental to the success of those adjustments, explaining somehow the decrease of risk premium 
associated with debt and, therefore, crowding-in evidences. 
3 Such reasoning is sometimes also labelled as “the expectational view of fiscal policy” (see Hellwig and Neumann, 
2014). 
4 Gupta et al. (2018) conclude that governments are not electorally penalized when they are successful to launch 
a fiscal consolidation at the same time that financial markets tend to recognize that success in bringing public 
finances to a sustainable trajectory. 
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consolidations with(out) monetary policy accommodation. The success  of fiscal consolidations 
can be intimately related with monetary policy accommodation (see, for instance, Jalil, 2016; 
Afonso and Martins, 2016). 
In addition, Bertola and Drazen (1993) refer to a “trigger point” as a moment after which a 
fiscal adjustment is highly probable. When government spending rises above a given threshold, 
this increases the probability that a fiscal consolidation will take place. In this context, 
consumers tend to exhibit a more Ricardian behaviour. The authors show this by using a model 
of intertemporal optimizing behaviour that, if government spending follows an upward-trending 
stochastic process and if the public believes that, the resulting fiscal imbalance will be cut 
sharply by tax increases when a specific trigger point is reached, there will be a nonlinear 
negative relationship between private sector consumption and government spending.  
Several studies have empirically tackled the issue we are revisiting in this paper, although 
with somewhat inconclusive results (see Hjelm, 2002, Ahtiala and Kanto, 2002, van Aarle and 
Garretsen, 2003, Afonso, 2010, Guajardo et al., 2014, Yang et al., 2015). Gobbin and van Aarle 
(2001) analysed EU countries and found that non-Keynesian effects dominated the traditional 
Keynesian expenditure effects of government spending, taxation, and transfers. For instance, 
Afonso (2010) mentioned that regarding general government final consumption there was no 
statistically significant short-run effect on private consumption, with or without fiscal 
consolidations for an OECD panel, while Yang et al. (2015) proposing a new definition for the 
CAPB based on the fluctuations in asset prices and specific-country’s fiscal policy features, did 
not support non-Keynesian effects from fiscal consolidations.  
Another important aspect is composition. Some studies such as Alesina and Ardagna (2010) 
and Alesina et al. (2019) conclude for large differential effects when fiscal consolidations are 
based on government spending cuts or tax increases. These authors argue that there are lesser 
harmful effects when governments choose to consolidate via a spending reduction. On the other 
hand, Wiese et al. (2018) conclude that it is indifferent to implement a fiscal consolitdation via 
tax incrases or via spending reductions in what respects the degree of success of that 
consolitation. However, it was found that left-wing and right-wing governments are more 
successful in their consolidations when they rely on spending and on taxes, respectively5. In 
addition to the political economy effects on fiscal consolidations, it appears that a higher degree 
of centralization is positively correlated with improvements in primary balances.The higher the 
power to spend and tax on low levels of governments the higher is the probability of bringing 
                                                          
5 Some articles as Tavares (2004) and Potrafke (2011), among others, have studied the linkage between the political 
spectrum of governments and the degree of success of fiscal consolidations, via taxation or spending. 
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public finances towards a sustainable path (Foremny et al., 2017). Moreover, Afonso and Jalles 
(2017) reported that fiscal consolidations based on the spending-side tended to be more counter-
cyclical than those consolidations via taxation in what respects markups dynamics over the 
short- and medium-terms. 
Regarding the effects of fiscal consolidations on private investment, via, for instance, lower 
overall costs to provide public services or due to a downward impact on the sovereign yield, 
the question also deserves an empirical assessment. A few results have been provided arguing 
for a positive effect of a fiscal consolidation on private investment, notably Ardagna (2009) and 
Schaltegger and Weder (2012). Finally, Afonso and Martins (2016) looking at a sample of 14 
EU countries showed that, in some cases, when fiscal consolidations are coupled with monetary 
expansions, the traditional Keynesian result is reversed. 
 
3. Fiscal episodes 
3.1. Approaches to determine fiscal episodes 
The literature addressing the identification of fiscal episodes is vast and has mostly relied on 
changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as a share of the GDP. Some caveats 
surrounding this approach have been highlighted recently. The CAPB approach could bias 
empirical estimates towards finding evidence of non-Keynesian effects (see, e.g., Afonso and 
Jalles, 2014). Many non-policy factors influence the CAPB and can lead to erroneous 
conclusions regarding fiscal policy changes.6 Even when the CAPB accurately measures fiscal 
actions these include discretionary responses to economic developments.  
Despite these known drawbacks, the alternative “narrative approach” to identifying fiscal 
episodes cannot be considered in our study, which looks at a large heterogeneous sample of 
countries, the reason being that the publicly available dataset compiled by Devries et al. (2011) 
covers only 17 advanced economies and it ends in 2009 (which is by now outdated). Hence, the 
analysis that follows relies on changes in the CAPB. When using this quantitative method to 
identifying fiscal episodes, some approaches have been commonly adopted, namely: 
i) Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), who decrease the probability of fiscal adjustment periods with 
only one year by using a limit of 3 percentage points of GDP for a single year consolidation. 
They proposed using the cumulative changes in the CAPB that are at least 5, 4, 3 percentage 
points of GDP in respectively 4, 3 or 2 years, or 3 percentage points in one year. 
                                                          
6 For example, a stock price boom raises the CAPB by increasing capital gains tax revenue and tends to coincide 
with an expansion in private demand (Morris and Schuknecht, 2007). 
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ii) Alesina and Ardagna (1998), who adopted a fiscal episode definition that allows that some 
stabilization periods may have only one year. They considered the change in the CAPB that 
is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 percentage points on average 
in the last two years. 
iii) Afonso (2010), who defined the occurrence of a fiscal episode when either the change in the 
CAPB is at least one and a half times the standard deviation (from the panel of countries 
under scrutiny) in one year, or when the change in the CAPB is at least one standard 
deviation on average in the last two years. 
Fiscal consolidation episodes identified using changes in the CAPB can either use a publicly 
available source – such as the IMF WEO – or be computed using a filtering approach (by 
decomposing GDP into its cyclical and trend components). Despite substantial progress in the 
estimation methodologies to calculate potential output, there is still not a widely accepted 
approach in the profession. According to Borio (2013), researchers frequently adopt two 
alternative approaches to estimate potential GDP: i) there are univariate statistical approaches, 
which usually consist of filtering out the trend component from the cyclical one; ii) there are 
the structural approaches, which derive the estimates directly from the theoretical structure of 
a model.  
Aware of the shortcomings of using either of the two approaches7, and at the cost of not 
maximizing the total number of observations in our panel dataset, instead of relying on the 
IMF’s WEO measure of the CAPB8, we rather apply two filtering techniques. Mindful of the 
criticisms surrounding the use of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (such as the identification of 
spurious cycles, inter alia), particularly in the context of a large sample of very heterogeneous 
countries (see Harvey and Jaeger, 1993; Cogley and Nason, 1995), Hamilton (2018) proposed 
an alternative method. Hamilton’s (2018) approach to extract the cyclical and trend component 





, respectively), consists of estimating:  
 
 𝑦𝑡+ℎ = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑦𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡+ℎ
𝑘
𝑗=0  (1) 
 
                                                          
7 Statistical methods suffer from the end-point problem, that is, they are extremely sensitive to the addition of new 
data and to real-time data revisions. Structural models, on the other hand, may be difficult to implement 
consistently in cross-sectional environments and rely on the imposition of pre-determined assumptions. 
8 The IMF does not have an official method for computing potential output and every country desk decides which 
measure fits best. While the most common IMF approach uses a production function approach, assumptions vary 
greatly across countries and discretion is left to the country desks. 
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where 𝑦𝑡 equals the sum of the trend and cyclical components, that is, 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡
𝜏 + 𝑦𝑡
𝑐. The 
stationary part of regression (1) provides the cyclical component: 
 
                         𝑦𝑡
𝑐 = ?̂?𝑡 (2) 
 
while the trend is given by 
 𝑦𝑡




Hamilton (2018) suggested that h and k should be chosen such that the residuals from 
equation (1) are stationary and points out that, for a broad array of processes, the fourth 
differences of a series are indeed stationary. We choose h = 2, since a 2-year horizon would be 
consistent with business cycles, and k = 3, which is line with the dynamics seen in real GDP.  
Once the output gap is obtained, we then use it to get a measure of the CAPB. Reflecting 
the fact that the elasticity of government revenues (REV) to output growth is close to one while 
primary expenditure (PEXP) is largely inelastic to growth (we take the same assumption as 
Girouard and André, 2005), we multiply government revenues by the factor [1/(1+OG/100)] to 
get 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑎𝑑𝑗 (revenue adjusted), with OG being the output gap obtained via the HP or the 
Hamilton filter. Mathematically we have: 
 
 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵 = 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑎𝑑𝑗 − 𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃, (4) 
 
where 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑎𝑑𝑗 = REV*[1/(1+OG/100) and OG is the Output Gap, computed applying the HP-
filter and Hamilton’s (2018) approach. 
      In this paper, we will make use of three measures of the CAPB: i) the WEO (which limits 
the country-time coverage); ii) the HP-based; and iii) the Hamilton-based, the latter two 
maximizing the total available number of observations for econometric purposes. Mindful of 
the alternative set of quantitative criteria used to identify fiscal consolidations, we take a middle 
ground approach. Fiscal consolidation episodes are defined as those that show at least a positive 
annual change in the CAPB of 0.5 percent of GDP for two consecutive years. A dummy variable 
is created which takes the value 1 if there is a consolidation year and 0 otherwise. The episode 
is then classified as expenditure-based if the absolute change in primary spending (in percent 
of GDP) divided by the absolute change in the CAPB (in percent of GDP) is larger than 0.5, 
provided that there is a consolidation and provided that the change in (primary) spending is 
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negative. If the ratio is less than 0.5 and/or the change in (primary) spending is positive within 
a given consolidation episode, that episode is defined as tax-based one instead. Succinctly, we 
have then an expenditure-based fiscal episode when, 
|∆𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃|
|∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵|
> 0.5 % (𝐺𝐷𝑃) and ∆𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃 < 0; 
and a tax-based fiscal episode when, 
|∆𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃|
|∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐵|
< 0.5 % (𝐺𝐷𝑃) and/or ∆𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑃 > 0. 
 
3.2. Fiscal episodes  
In Tables 1a-1b we report the fiscal austerity episodes computed according to the above 
mentioned three underlying measures of the CAPB, for the period 1970-2018, for 37 advanced 
economies and for 137 developing economies (Appendix Table A1 report the related summary 
statistics for the full sample and per criteria). 
 
Table 1a: Fiscal Consolidations based on the change in the CAPB, WEO, HP-based and 
Hamilton-based (Advanced Economies) 
 
Country WEO-Based HP-Based Hamilton-Based 
Australia 1995-1997, 2012-2013 1995-1997, 2012-2013 1995-1997, 2012-2013 
Austria 1997, 2011-2013 1997, 2011 1997, 2011 
Belgium 1985-1987, 1990, 1998 1985-1987, 1990, 1994, 1998 1985, 1990, 1994, 1998 
Canada 1987-1988, 1995-1997, 2012-2015 1987-1988, 1995-1997, 2012-2014 1987-1988, 1995-1997, 2012-2014 
Cyprus 2005, 2013-2014 2005-2007, 2013-2014, 2018 2005-2007, 2013-2014, 2018 
Czech Republic 1997, 2011 2007, 2011, 2016-2017 2007, 2011, 2016-2017 
Denmark 1997-1998, 2005, 2014 1984-1986, 1998-1999, 2005, 2014, 2017 1984-1986, 1997-2000, 2005, 2014, 2017 
Estonia 2010 2010 2010 
Finland n.a. 1989, 1997-1998, 2007, 2016-2017 1989, 1997-1998, 2007, 2016-2017 
Germany 1993-1994, 2004, 2012 1997, 2000, 2007, 2012 2000, 2007, 2012 
Greece 1991-1994, 2000, 2011-2013 1991-1992, 2011-2013, 2016 1991, 2000, 2011-2013, 2016 
Hong Kong SAR 2007, 2010, 2017 2007, 2010, 2017 2007, 2010, 2017 
Iceland 2005-2006, 2010-2014 1991, 1996-1997, 2005, 2012-2014 1991, 1996-1997, 2005-2006, 2012-2014 
Ireland 2004, 2011-2015 1997, 2004, 2012-2014 1997, 2004, 2012-2014, 2017 
Israel 2004-2005, 2015 2005-2006, 2011, 2015 2005-2006, 2015 
Italy 1992-1993, 1996-1997 1991-1993, 1996-1997, 2011-2012 1991-1993, 1996-1997, 2011-2012 
Japan 2005-2006, 2015 1981, 1985, 1988, 2005-2006, 2015 1981, 1985, 1988, 2005-2006, 2015 
Latvia 2012, 2016 2011-2012 2012, 2016 
Lithuania 2003, 2010 n.a. n.a. 
Luxembourg 1997, 2006, 2012 2006-2007 2001, 2006-2007, 2013 
Macao SAR n.a. 2004-2008, 2011 2008, 2011 
Malta 2005, 2017 2005, 2010, 2017 2005, 2010, 2017 
Netherlands 2005, 2012-2014 2005, 2012-2014, 2017 2005, 2013, 2017 
New Zealand 2012-2013 1987-1988, 1994-1995, 2003, 2012-2016 
1987-1989, 1994-1995, 2001-2004, 2012-
2016 
Norway 1994-1997 
1980, 1994-1997, 2000, 2005-2006, 2011-2012, 
2018 
1980, 1994-1997, 2000, 2005-2006, 2011-
2012, 2018 
Portugal 2007, 2012-2013, 2016 2007, 2012-2013, 2016 2007, 2012-2013, 2016 
Puerto Rico n.a. 2016 2016 
San Marino n.a. 2010-2012 2010, 2015-2018 
Slovak Republic 1998, 2004 1998 2012-2013 
Slovenia 2012-2013, 2016 2015-2016 2015-2016 
Spain 1997, 2011-2014 1987, 1997-1999, 2006, 2014, 2017 1987, 1997, 2006, 2014, 2017 
Sweden 1995-1998, 2001, 2016 1984, 1987, 1995-1998, 2005, 2016 1984, 1987, 1995-1998, 2005, 2016 
Switzerland 1995 1995, 2006 1995, 2006 
United Kingdom 1995-1999, 2011, 2017 1980, 1995-2000, 2011, 2016-2017 1980, 1988, 1995-2000, 2011, 2016-2017 
United States 2006, 2012-2014 2006, 2011-2013 2006, 2011-2013 
Years with episodes 122 169 171 
Average duration (years) 1.783 1.690 1.629 




Table 1b: Fiscal Consolidations based on the change in the CAPB, WEO, HP-based and 
Hamilton-based (Developing Economies) 
 
Country WEO-Based HP-Based Hamilton-Based 
Afghanistan n.a. 2006, 2010, 2016 2010, 2016 
Albania n.a. 2016 2016 
Algeria 2011, 2017 1995-1996, 2000, 2017-2018 1995-1996, 2000, 2017-2018 
Angola 2004-2006, 2010 2005-2006, 2011 2005-2006, 2011 
Anguilla n.a. 2003, 2006-2007, 2011 2003-2007, 2011 
Antigua and Barbuda n.a. 1996, 2003-2004 1996, 2008 
Argentina 2003-2004 2003-2004 2003-2004, 2018 
Armenia n.a. 2011-2012, 2018 2011-2012, 2018 
Aruba n.a. 2008 2006-2008 
Azerbaijan n.a. 1998, 2001, 2017-2018 2001, 2008 
Bahamas, The n.a. 1994, 1999, 2015-2016 1999, 2015-2016 
Bahrain n.a. 1996, 1999-2000, 2004-2005, 2017-2018 1996, 2004-2005, 2017-2018 
Barbados 1998, 2017 2017 1998, 2017 
Belarus 2012, 2017 2010-2012, 2017-2018 2010 
Belize n.a. 2005-2008, 2011, 2017-2018 2002, 2005-2006, 2017-2018 
Benin n.a. 1993, 2004, 2007, 2017-2018 1993, 2004, 2007, 2017-2018 
Bhutan n.a. 1991, 2007-2009 1991, 2007-2009 
Bolivia n.a. 1995, 2004-2006 1990, 1995, 2000, 2004-2006 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002-2003, 2006, 2011-2013 2002-2003, 2006, 2011-2013, 2016-2018 2006, 2011, 2018 
Botswana 2004-2006, 2011-2013 2004-2006, 2011-2013 2004-2006, 2011-2013 
Brazil 1999, 2017 1999 n.a. 
Brunei Darussalam n.a. 1991, 1996, 2000, 2004-2006, 2011, 2018 1996, 2000, 2004-2006, 2011, 2018 
Bulgaria 2004, 2012, 2016 2012, 2016 2004, 2012, 2016 
Burkina Faso n.a. 1989, 1992 1989, 1992 
Cabo Verde n.a. 1996-1998, 2004, 2014-2016 1996-1998, 2004, 2014-2016 
Cambodia n.a. 2005, 2014 2014 
Cameroon n.a. 2006, 2018 2006, 2018 
Central African Republic n.a. 1993, 1996, 2015-2016 1993, 1996, 2015-2016 
Chad n.a. 1998, 2005-2006, 2011, 2016-2018 1998, 2005-2006, 2011, 2016-2018 
Chile 2005-2006, 2011 2004-2006, 2011 2004-2006, 2011 
China 2004 2004 2004 
Colombia 2012 1991, 2001, 2012 1991, 2012 
Comoros n.a. 1986-1989, 1997, 2005, 2010, 2013 1986-1989, 1997, 2005, 2010, 2013 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
the 
n.a. 2002, 2005 2002, 2005 
Congo, Republic of n.a. 1994-1996, 2000, 2004-2006, 2017-2018 1994-1996, 2000, 2004-2006, 2017-2018 
Costa Rica n.a. 2006-2007 2006-2007 
Croatia 2016-2017 1994, 2016-2017 2016-2017 
Cote d'Ivoire n.a. 2001 2001 
Djibouti n.a. 2004-2006, 2017-2018 2001, 2004-2006, 2017-2018 
Dominica n.a. 1996, 2012-2013, 2018 1996, 2006, 2009-2013, 2016-2018 
Dominican Republic 2005 2005, 2014-2015 2005, 2014-2015 
Ecuador 2010-2011 2000, 2011, 2018 2000, 2011, 2018 
Egypt 2004, 2017 2018 2018 
El Salvador 2004, 2017 2007, 2017 1994, 2007, 2013, 2017 
Equatorial Guinea n.a. 1996-1997, 2002, 2006, 2011. 2017-2018 1996-1997, 2002, 2006, 2011, 2017-2018 
Eritrea n.a. 1997, 2003-2004 2003-2004 
Eswatini n.a. 1988-1989, 2006, 2012 1988-1989, 2006, 2012 
Ethiopia n.a. 1992-1993, 2004 1992-1993, 2004, 2009 
Fiji n.a. 1995, 2008, 2013 1995, 2008, 2013 
Gabon n.a. 1995, 2000, 2018 1995, 2000, 2018 
Gambia, The n.a. n.a. 2012 
Georgia 2011 2011 2011 
Ghana n.a. 1982, 1995, 2015 1982, 1995, 2014-2015 
Grenada 2004, 2009-2010, 2015-2016 1992-1993, 2004, 2009-2010, 2015-2016 
1992-1993, 2001, 2004, 2008-2010, 
2016-2017 
Guinea n.a. 2005 2005 
Guinea-Bissau n.a. 1996, 2000-2001, 2009 1996, 2000-2001, 2009 
Guyana 2010 2008 2008 
Haiti n.a. 2005, 2015-2016 2005, 2015-2016 
Honduras n.a. 1992, 1995, 2005, 2011, 2015 1992, 1995, 2005, 2011, 2015 
Hungary 2008-2009 2000, 2004, 2008 2000, 2004, 2008 
India 2000, 2005-2007, 2013 1995, 2000, 2005-2007, 2013 1995, 2000, 2005-2007, 2013 
Indonesia n.a. 1999, 2002 1999, 2002 
Iran n.a. 2004 2004 
Iraq n.a. 2006, 2011, 2018 2006, 2011, 2018 
Jamaica n.a. 1999-2000, 2013 1999-2000, 2013 
Jordan 2011, 2014, 2017 1989, 2014 1989, 2014 
Kazakhstan 2006, 2011 2006, 2011 2006, 2011 
Kenya 2004 1988, 1994-1995, 1999, 2004, 2018 1988, 1994-1995, 1999, 2004, 2018 
Kiribati n.a. 1998, 2010, 2013-2015 1998, 2010, 2013-2015 
Kosovo n.a. 2015-2016 2015 
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Country WEO-Based HP-Based Hamilton-Based 
Kuwait n.a. 1993-1997, 2000, 2005, 2018 1993-1997, 2000, 2005, 2018 
Kyrgyz Republic n.a. 2001-2002-2006-2008, 2018 2001-2003, 2006-2007, 2018 
Lao P.D.R. n.a. 2011-2012, 2015 2011-2012, 2015 
Lebanon 2002, 2009-2010, 2014-2016 1998-1999, 2002-2003 1998-1999, 2002-2003 
Lesotho n.a. 1984, 1990, 2003-2004 1984, 1990, 2003-2004 
Liberia n.a. 2015-2016 2009, 2015-2016 
Libya n.a. 1995-1996, 2000, 2005, 2017-2018 1995-1996, 2000, 2005-2006, 2017-2018 
Madagascar n.a. 1982-1983, 1996-1997, 2006 1982-1983, 1996-1997, 2006 
Malawi n.a. n.a. 2010 
Malaysia 1994, 2002, 2005, 2011 1994, 2002, 2005, 2011 1994, 2002, 2005, 2011 
Maldives n.a. 2007, 2011-2013 2011-2013 
Marshall Islands n.a. 2017 2017 
Mauritania n.a. 2010, 2016-2018 2010, 2016-2018 
Mauritius 2008 n.a. n.a. 
Mexico 2000-2001 2001, 2016-2017 2000-2001, 2017 
Micronesia n.a. 2008-2009, 2015, 2018 2008-2009, 2015, 2018 
Moldova n.a. 1998-1999, 2017 1999, 2004, 2017 
Mongolia n.a. 1995, 2000-2001, 2004-2006 1995, 2000-2001, 2004-2006 
Montenegro, Rep. of n.a. 2007, 2013-2014 2007, 2010, 2013-2014 
Morocco 2007 1997, 2007 1997, 2007 
Mozambique n.a. 
1985, 1988-1989, 1992, 2003, 2013, 2016-
2017 
1985, 1992, 1999, 2003, 2013, 2016-2017 
Myanmar n.a. 2013 2013 
Namibia n.a. 1994, 2000, 2005-2007 2000, 2005-2007 
Niger n.a. 2001, 2006, 2011 2006, 2011 
Nigeria n.a. 1995, 2000, 2011 2000, 2011 
North Macedonia 2017 2000, 2016 2000, 2016 
Oman n.a. 1996-1997, 2000, 2005, 2011, 2018 1996-1997, 2000, 2006, 2011, 2018 
Panama 2000, 2006-2007 1996, 2000, 2006-2007, 2016 1996, 2000, 2006-2007, 2016 
Papua New Guinea n.a. 1995, 2007, 2015 1995, 2007, 2015-2017 
Paraguay n.a. 1986, 1990, 1994, 2004, 2011 1986, 1990, 1998, 2004, 2011 
Peru 2007, 2011 2007, 2011 2007, 2011 
Philippines 2004-2006 2004-2006 2004-2006 
Poland 2012 2005, 2012, 2018 2005, 2012, 2016-2018 
Qatar n.a. 1999-2000, 2012-2013, 2018 1999-2000, 2012-2013, 2018 
Romania 2010-2012 1998-1999, 2011-2012 1998-1999, 2011-2012 
Russia 2005, 2011 2000, 2005, 2011, 2018 2000, 2005, 2011, 2018 
Rwanda n.a. 2004, 2016 2004, 2016 
Saudi Arabia n.a. 1995-1997, 2000, 2004-2006, 2011, 2018 1995-1997, 2000, 2004-2006, 2011, 2018 
Senegal 2015 2017 2017 
Serbia 2016-2017 2004-2005, 2016-2017 2004-2005, 2016-2017 
Seychelles n.a. 1988 1988, 1995 
Sierra Leone n.a. 2018 n.a. 
Solomon Islands n.a. 2010 2007, 2010 
South Africa n.a. 2006 2006 
Sri Lanka n.a. 1997, 2003 1997 
St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. 1995, 2002-2003, 2012-2013 1997, 2002-2003, 2007, 2012-2013 
St. Lucia n.a. 1994, 2014-2016 1988, 1991, 2007-2008, 2014 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines n.a. 1993, 1999-2001, 2009-2012, 2015-2016 
1989, 1993, 1996, 1999-2000, 2005, 
2009, 2015-2016 
Sudan n.a. 1993-1994, 1997, 2014-2015 1993-1994, 1997, 2003, 2014-2015 
Suriname 2006-2007, 2017 1993-1996, 2006-2007, 2017-2018 2006-2007, 2017 
Syria n.a. 1996-1997 1996-1997 
São Tomé and Príncipe n.a. 2013, 2017-2018 2013, 2017-2018 
Tajikistan n.a. 2002, 2011-2012, 2018 2002, 2011-2012, 2018 
Tanzania n.a. 1996, 2017 1996, 2014, 2017 
Thailand n.a. 2011 2011 
Timor-Leste n.a. 2005, 2018 2010-2011, 2018 
Togo n.a. 1995 1995, 2008 
Tonga n.a. 2003-2004, 2014, 2017-2018 2002, 2009, 2014-2017 
Trinidad and Tobago n.a. 1990-1991, 2018 1990-1991, 2018 
Tunisia 1993-1994 1993-1994, 1998, 2018 1998 
Turkey n.a. 2011 2011 
Tuvalu n.a. 2008, 2012-2013 2008, 2012-2013 
Uganda n.a. 2004, 2017 2004, 2017 
Ukraine 2015 1999, 2011, 2015 1999, 2006, 2011, 2015 
United Arab Emirates n.a. n.a. 1995, 2000, 2004-2006, 2011-2012, 2017 
Uruguay 2002-2003 2001-2004 2003 
Uzbekistan n.a. 2004, 2007-2008, 2011 2004, 2007-2008, 2011-2012 
Vanuatu n.a. 1997, 2004-2005, 2012-2013 1997, 2004-2005, 2012-2013 
Vietnam n.a. 2011, 2015-2016 2011, 2015-2016 
Yemen n.a. 1996, 2000, 2011 2000, 2011 
Zimbabwe n.a. 2009, 2010 2009 
Years with episodes 103 503 498 
Average duration (years) 1.474 1.462 1.423 




From Table 1 we observe that the number of fiscal episodes is significantly lower when we 
consider the WEO-based consolidation criterion when compared to either the HP-based or the 
Hamilton-based criteria. In fact, while we count 123 episodes for the WEO-based criterion, we 
observe 169 and 171 consolidation episodes for the HP-based and the Hamilton-based fiscal 
consolidation criteria for advanced economies, respectively. The same pattern can be traced for 
developing economies: our results establish a set of 112 WEO-based, 503 HP-based and 498 
Hamilton-based fiscal consolidation episodes. It seems that the duration of a fiscal episode is 
higher for advanced economies than the duration observed for developing economies. In fact, 
while the reported duration is, on average, of 1.7 years for advanced economies, the duration 
of fiscal episodes for developing economies is slightly lower - 1.5 years. The three methods 
that determine fiscal austerity episodes on the basis of the change in the CAPB essentially 
coincide in identifying, for instance, the fiscal contractions of Australia in 1995-1997 and 2012-
2013 periods and of China in 2004. 
 
Figure 1: Changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance: 1970-2018, all sample 
 
WEO-based CAPB HP-based CAPB Hamilton-based CAPB 
   
Note: CAPB expressed in percent of potential GDP. Top and bottom 1% of the change in the respective CAPB 
dropped to remove serious outliers. HP-based CAPB and Hamilton-based CAPB distributions constrained – for 
comparison purposes – to map the same country-time coverage as the one available for the WEO CAPB. 
 
From Figure 1 we also see that the average change in the CAPB (expressed in percent of 
potential GDP) in the full panel is -0.07%, -0.08% and -0.10% for WEO-based, HP-based and 
Hamilton-based CAPB, respectively, and the standard deviation is 2.72, 4.02 and 3.85 for 
WEO-based, HP-based and Hamilton-based approaches, respectively. When we look for the 
average change in the CAPB by development stage it is roughly the same as for the full sample 
(by criterion, respectively). However, the volatility of the CAPB changes are greater for 
advanced economies than that can be observed for developing ones. Figure A1 in the appendix 











































3.3. Characteristics of the fiscal episodes  
As far as the characteristics of fiscal episodes are concerned, initial fiscal conditions 
prevailing just before the beginning of a given consolidation episode seem to have had an 
impact on the size of subsequent fiscal efforts (Figure 2). The lower the CAPB, the larger the 
size of the ensuing fiscal consolidation. This may reflect that large budget deficits made it more 
necessary to consolidate and, at the same time, raised public awareness of the extent of the 
fiscal imbalance problem, making it easier to act. When inspecting each income group 
independently, we conclude advanced economies seem to have been more concerned with fiscal 
sustainability relative to developing economies (Figure A2 in the appendix plots, by income 
group, the improvement in budgetary position versus the budget position in the year before 
fiscal consolidation). 
 




Note: budget position measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of potential GDP), vertical axis. 
“improvement” measured during the consolidation years of the identified episode, horizontal axis.  
 
Most the fiscal consolidation episodes were of short duration (with some exceptions for the 
WEO IMF-based measure - see Table 1) and involved relatively modest gains (Figure 3). 
However, there were a number of large efforts, amounting to improvements of more than 7 
percent of GDP for the four measures, as well as a few episodes lasting for four years (or more 
in the case of the IMF-based measure). When looking in more detail at the distribution of 
episodes by duration for each income group, we conclude that fiscal consolidation episodes 
were longer in advanced economies than in developing economies. Advanced economies 
experienced fiscal episodes lasting a maximum of 5 years– there are more than 30 episodes 
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with a duration greater than 3 years. In contrast, emerging markets experienced consolidations 
lasting a maximum of 3 years per episode.  That said, the improvement in the budget position 
for developing economies is more concentrated than the one observed for advanced economies. 
This is not entirely surprising since government debt levels in developing economies are 
typically lower than those in advanced economies, illustrating better fiscal sustainability 
positions for the former. Results by income group are illustrated in Appendix Figure A6. 
 
Figure 3: Strength and duration of consolidation episodes: 1970-2018, full sample 
WEO-based CAPB 
   
Note: budget position measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of potential GDP). “improvement” 
measured during the consolidation years of the identified episode.  
 
 
Figure 4: Relationship between duration and size of consolidation: 1970-2018, full 
sample, WEO-based CAPB 
 
 
Note: budget position measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of potential GDP). “improvement” 
measured during the consolidation years of the identified episode.  
 
In general, it is also possible to observe that sizeable fiscal consolidations lasted for longer 
periods and vice-versa (Figure 4). The time distribution of fiscal episodes is less concentrated 
for advanced economies than for emerging ones. Moreover, we note that budget position 
14 
 
improvements are comparatively bigger for advanced economies, improving the overall fiscal 
sustainability levels for this income group. Figure A4 in the Appendix reports this set of results 
by income group. 
 
4. Effects of Fiscal Adjustments  
4.1. Stylised facts: fiscal consolidations and macroeconomic and fiscal variables 
In this sub-section, we assess some stylised links between fiscal consolidations and a series 
of macroeconomic and fiscal variables, namely real GDP growth, private consumption, private 
investment, the debt-to-GDP ratio, government consumption and tax revenues. Figure 5 
illustrates as an event-study-type chart, the paths of several of these variables by showing 
averages from two years before the consolidation to up to two years after.  
 
Figure 5: Overview of Selected Fiscal and Macroeconomic Indicators around 
consolidation episodes, overall sample 
CAPB (% GDP) Public Debt (% GDP) 
  
Real GDP growth (%) Inflation rate (%) 
  
Note: “t” corresponds to the first year of the consolidation episode. Horizontal axis in years. Consolidations 
identified using the WEO-based CAPB. 
 
The expected improvement in the CAPB during and after the consolidation episode takes 
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in total government revenues. This dynamics is true for both advanced and emerging 
economies. However, for developing economies we observe a deterioration of CAPB two years 
after the fiscal consolidation episode. The magnitude of this deterioration seems to overcome 
the fiscal improvement registered during the fiscal consolidation. It is also interesting to note 
that despite the decrease in total government expenditures identified above, government final 
consumption increases during and after the consolidation period. However, one does observe a 
reduction in public investment after the end of the consolidation episode (translating a lagged 
negative effect).  
Finally, fiscal consolidations seem to be related to increases in government debt ratios (both 
during and after). Yet, the dynamics of government debt ratios evidence a reduction of almost 
2 p.p. during the after fiscal contractions. This patterns is similar to what happens when we 
observe the dynamics of government debt before and after fiscal consolidations by income 
group (see. Appendix figures A5 and A6 for the illustration). 
 
4.2. Baseline Empirical Analysis 
In addition to unconditional relationships, we want to empirically analysed more closely the 
impact of fiscal episodes on private consumption and investment. There are two main 
approaches when specifying consumption functions: one is the Euler approach (Perotti, 1999) 
and the other is the solved-out function approach (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996). There is a 
debate as to which one to use (see Campbell, 1996 for further discussion). We follow the latter 
approach (even though it is not based on microeconomic foundations), which has also been 
applied in van Aarle and Garretsen (2003) and Afonso (2010).  
The baseline specifications for the real per capita private consumption and real per capita 
private investment are given by equations (4) and (5) below, respectively: 
 
 𝛥𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜆𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔0𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔1𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
𝑎𝑣 + 𝛿1𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣 + (5) 
(𝛼1𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡) × 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑚 + (𝛼2𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡) × (1 − 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑚) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
 
 𝛥𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜆𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔0𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔1𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
𝑎𝑣 + 𝛿1𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑣 + (6) 
(𝛼1𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡) × 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑚 + (𝛼2𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡) × (1 − 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡




where the index i denotes the country, the index t indicates the period (in years), and ci denotes 
country fixed effects to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity. In addition, we 
consider: C – private consumption; I – private investment (gross fixed capital formation); Y – 
GDP; Yav –GDP of the full country sample (or respective sub-sample when regressions are 
carried out by income group, that is, GDP for the group of advanced economies and GDP for 
the group of developing economies) (per capita averages); FCE – general government final 
consumption expenditure; TF – social transfers; TAX – taxes.  
All the above-mentioned variables are taken as the logarithms of the respective real per 
capita observations (the GDP deflator is used to deflate nominal variables). FCm is a dummy 
variable that controls for the existence of fiscal consolidation episodes, with m=1, 2, 3 for each 
of the fiscal episode criteria used (which can be WEO-based, HP-based or Hamilton-based, 
giving us a total of three possible alternatives). The dummy variable FCm takes yearly values 
and follows the rule: FCm = 1 when there is a fiscal consolidation; FCm = 0 when a fiscal 
consolidation does not occur. Additionally, it is assumed that the disturbances uit are 
independent and identically distributed random shocks across countries, with zero mean and 
constant variance.9  
We begin by estimating the baseline regressions with OLS considering government 
consumption, social transfers, and tax revenues together to reduce possible omitted variable 
bias.10  
In addition, we also report the results of a panel Two-Stage-Least Squares estimation with 
instruments or the consolidation dummy being the first two lags of our regressors.11 This way 
we arguably address endogeneity concerns as, e.g., tax revenues and social transfers can be 
expected to partly fluctuate automatically with economic activity, raising the issue of reversed 
causality.  
Tables 2 and 3report the results for the baseline estimation of both private consumption and 
investment for the full panel using OLS and IV, respectively. They show that increases in 
general government final consumption expenditure have a statistically significant and positive 
(Keynesian) effect on real per capita private consumption. This occurs both when there are no 
                                                          
9We have conducted Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root tests whose results sugested the rejection the null of a 
common unit root. Such results are presented in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
10 Alternatively, we estimated specification (5) and (6) with each one of these budgetary items at a time and we 
obtained similar results (these results are available upon request). 
11 The Sargan-Hansen test, which is a test of overidentifying restrictions, confirms the validity of the used 
instruments at usual significance levels. 
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fiscal consolidations, and also when a fiscal consolidation episode takes place. However, the 
magnitude of that effect is higher when in the presence of a fiscal consolidation. 
The increase of social transfers also positively influences private consumption, but this there 
is more uncertainty surrounding this estimate. This effect is stronger where a fiscal 
consolidation is taking place. We also find a positive influence of tax revenue increases on per 
capita consumption when the economy is consolidating its fiscal accounts, suggesting a 
Ricardian behaviour by economic agents (the impact of an increase in taxation does not impact 
consumption when fiscal consolidations episodes are not taking place). This result is true for 
the cases of the HP-based and Hamilton-based CAPB approaches. 
As far as real per capita investment is concerned, we observe that the increase in social 
transfers in when a fiscal consolidation is happening has the opposite effect vis-à-vis those seen 
for consumption: there is a positive effect of social transfers on investment when a fiscal 
consolidation is taking place but real per capita investment seems to be reduced when fiscal 
consolidations are not observed. 
The impact of an increase in government expenditures also hampers real per capita 
investment (WEO-based criterion).This effect is stronger, in absolute terms, in when a fiscal 
consolidation is taking place. Conversely, an increase in taxes promotes per capita investment, 
with higher effects during fiscal consolidations (but this effect fades away when we control for 
possible endogeneity).  
Overall, and during fiscal episodes, it seems that fiscal contractions promote real per capita 
investment when based on government spending cuts and/or on increases in the level of 















Table 2: Estimation results for real per capita private consumption and investment, 
OLS – 1970-2018, all sample 
 
Dependent Variable Real Private consumption per capita Real Private Investment per capita 
 Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  WEO-based HP-Based Hamilton-based WEO-based HP-Based Hamilton-based 
𝜆 𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.199*** -0.276*** -0.278*** -0.228*** -0.387*** -0.373*** 
  (0.055) (0.073) (0.071) (0.041) (0.095) (0.099) 
𝜔0 𝑌𝑡−1 0.101* 0.218*** 0.225*** 0.298*** 0.111 0.157 
  (0.055) (0.053) (0.052) (0.110) (0.153) (0.151) 
𝜔1 𝛥𝑌𝑡  0.674*** 0.582*** 0.594*** 2.457*** 1.386*** 1.570*** 
  (0.083) (0.095) (0.096) (0.216) (0.477) (0.436) 
𝛿0 𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡−1 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.060 -0.044 -0.045 
  (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.039) (0.077) (0.075) 
𝛿1 𝛥𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡 0.033 0.055 0.056 0.026 0.358 0.444 
  (0.031) (0.070) (0.069) (0.135) (0.290) (0.286) 
𝛼1 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.105*** 0.003 0.004 -0.213** -0.132 -0.092 
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.101) (0.122) (0.107) 
𝛼2 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.084*** 0.023 0.025 -0.116* -0.141 -0.152 
  (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.066) (0.112) (0.112) 
𝛽1 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.023 0.005 0.004 -0.007 0.021 0.035 
  (0.022) (0.007) (0.007) (0.044) (0.039) (0.039) 
𝛽2 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.022 -0.004 -0.004 -0.020 0.038 0.032 
  (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) 
𝛾1 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.016 0.011 0.010 0.250*** 0.265** 0.200* 
  (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.091) (0.121) (0.109) 
𝛾2 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.167*** 0.253** 0.256** 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.057) (0.114) (0.111) 
𝛼3 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.126 0.065 0.010 -0.198 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.117) (0.084) (0.081) (0.376) (0.286) (0.292) 
𝛼4 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.084* 0.016 0.027 -0.118 0.030 0.095 
  (0.052) (0.042) (0.042) (0.123) (0.198) (0.194) 
𝛽3 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.043 0.001 -0.030 0.337* -0.005 -0.018 
  (0.058) (0.021) (0.048) (0.184) (0.066) (0.080) 
𝛽4 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.024 -0.016 -0.014 -0.060 0.016 0.008 
  (0.024) (0.010) (0.009) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) 
𝛾3 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.065 -0.080 -0.130* -0.014 0.263 0.548** 
  (0.072) (0.072) (0.079) (0.224) (0.225) (0.236) 
𝛾4 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.054 0.001 -0.001 0.117 0.258 0.189 
  (0.050) (0.032) (0.033) (0.109) (0.167) (0.156) 
         
Obs.  1,127 1,899 1,885 942 1,616 1,604 
R2  0.428 0.251 0.249 0.467 0.246 0.242 
# countries  61 98 98 51 86 86 
H0 (p-values)       
𝛼1 − 𝛼2 = 0 0.866 0.452 0.936 0.969 0.632 0.754 
𝛾1 − 𝛾2 = 0 0.261 0.237 0.096 0.290 0.995 0.139 
−𝛼1 − 𝛾1 = 0 0.015 0.693 0.692 0.665 0.148 0.249 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2 = 0 0.307 0.871 0.473 0.068 0.727 0.558 
        
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 




















Table 3: Estimation results for real per capita private consumption and investment, IV – 
1970-2018, all sample 
 
Dependent Variable Real Private consumption per capita Real Private Investment per capita 
 Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  WEO-based HP-Based Hamilton-based WEO-based HP-Based Hamilton-based 
𝜆 𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.202*** -0.268*** -0.274*** -0.219** -0.308*** -0.331*** 
  (0.064) (0.047) (0.046) (0.093) (0.052) (0.076) 
𝜔0 𝑌𝑡−1 -0.050 -0.004 0.085 0.422* -0.341 -0.309 
  (0.109) (0.103) (0.095) (0.252) (0.416) (0.506) 
𝜔1 𝛥𝑌𝑡  -0.298 -0.132 0.050 2.488** -0.184 0.535 
  (0.446) (0.351) (0.308) (1.096) (1.571) (1.780) 
𝛿0 𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡−1 -0.040* 0.010 -0.004 -0.093 -0.012 0.041 
  (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.058) (0.083) (0.114) 
𝛿1 𝛥𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡 -0.025 0.162** 0.135** -0.092 0.771** 0.679 
  (0.078) (0.074) (0.064) (0.163) (0.372) (0.432) 
𝛼1 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.150** 0.096 0.060 -0.345** 0.064 0.761 
  (0.066) (0.094) (0.092) (0.164) (0.457) (0.706) 
𝛼2 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.019 -0.000 -0.004 0.003 -0.030 -0.140 
  (0.038) (0.018) (0.018) (0.064) (0.108) (0.127) 
𝛽1 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.120 0.092* 0.079 0.280 0.437 -0.132 
  (0.095) (0.054) (0.063) (0.231) (0.346) (0.487) 
𝛽2 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.043 -0.318 -0.174 -0.242 0.296 9.975 
  (0.514) (0.949) (1.139) (1.181) (4.473) (8.106) 
𝛾1 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.169 0.666** 0.396* -0.996 1.246 1.193 
  (0.347) (0.276) (0.231) (0.677) (1.255) (1.599) 
𝛾2 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.177 -0.064 0.079 0.698 1.492 -0.303 
  (0.468) (0.288) (0.324) (1.278) (1.233) (1.707) 
𝛼3 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.071* -0.027 -0.053 -0.006 -0.094 -0.156 
  (0.038) (0.033) (0.036) (0.060) (0.178) (0.208) 
𝛼4 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 1.235* -0.106 0.082 -0.064 -0.901 0.113 
  (0.647) (0.542) (0.445) (1.599) (2.057) (1.812) 
𝛽3 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.585* 0.312* 0.251 0.357 0.904 0.354 
  (0.355) (0.176) (0.177) (0.842) (1.067) (1.325) 
𝛽4 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.106* 0.151** 0.102* -0.291* 0.168 0.374 
  (0.055) (0.071) (0.058) (0.153) (0.332) (0.436) 
𝛾3 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.041 -0.010 -0.018 -0.010 0.004 -0.045 
  (0.040) (0.013) (0.014) (0.054) (0.093) (0.096) 
𝛾4 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.181 0.053 0.054 0.238 0.302 0.166 
  (0.122) (0.047) (0.047) (0.248) (0.235) (0.336) 
        
Obs.  1,003 1,698 1,684 843 1,451 1,439 
# countries  60 96 96 50 84 84 
        
Kleibergen-Paap p-value  0.285 0.900 0.908 0.519 0.937 0.927 
Sargan–Hansen p-value  n.a. 0.619 0.326 0.012 0.604 0.720 
        
H0 (p-values)       
𝛼1 − 𝛼2 = 0 0.828 0.639 0.826 0.927 0.959 0.217 
𝛾1 − 𝛾2 = 0 0.073 0.725 0.995 0.823 0.558 0.908 
−𝛼1 − 𝛾1 = 0 0.010 0.030 0.054 0.765 0.184 0.186 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2 = 0 0.729 0.823 0.795 0.586 0.221 0.923 
        
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 
and time effects estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% 
levels.  
 
4.3. Robustness and Sensitivity 
4.3.1. Income Groups and Geographical Regions  
 To shed light on sample heterogeneity, we have estimated the effects of the Hamilton-
based fiscal consolidations on both per capita real private consumption and investment by 
income group (Table 4) and by geographical regions (Tables 5a and 5b). Results are relatively 
close to those reflected previously in Tables 2 and 3. However, these effects seem to matter the 
most in the case of advanced economies (for developing countries coefficient estimates are 
seldomly significant). Even when both groups of countries show a statistically significant effect 
of a given fiscal variable on private consumption or investment, the effect is typically stronger 
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in advanced economies (see e.g. the effect of taxes on real per capita private consumption, in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 4). 
 The effects on real per capita private consumption varies by geographical region. While 
the countries belonging to the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (MENAP) 
and Europe regions exhibit, during a fiscal consolidation, positive effects of government 
spending on private consumption, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries experience opposite 
effects of government spending on consumption (and this is independent of whether these 
economies are experiencing a fiscal consolidation or not-see Table 5a).Such results are also 
extensive to the effects of higher taxation on consumption for MENAP and European countries. 
Lastly, regarding social transfers, MENAP countries show stronger positive effects of this fiscal 
variable on private consumption during a fiscal consolidation episode,; in contrast we find 
evidence of a negative impact of an increase in transfers increase on consumption for Asian, 
SSA and European countries.  
For Asian countries we find evidence of negative effects of transfers on consumption 
during a fiscal episode (there are no statistically significant effects of social transfers in Asian 
countries in the absence of fiscal consolidations and vice-versa for SSA and European 
countries). In what concerns to the effects of fiscal consolidation over real private investment 
per capita, it is worth mentioning that tax revenues are relevant in explaining private investment 
















Table 4: Estimation results for real per capita private consumption and investment by 
country group, IV (Hamilton-based) – 1970-2018 
 
Dependent Variable Real Private consumption per capita Real Private investment per capita 
 Specification 1 2 3 4 
 Income Group AE DEV AE DEV 
𝜆 𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.089*** -0.276*** -0.235*** -0.333*** 
  (0.034) (0.050) (0.059) (0.081) 
𝜔0 𝑌𝑡−1 -0.009 0.057 0.402* -0.191 
  (0.047) (0.118) (0.244) (0.585) 
𝜔1 𝛥𝑌𝑡  0.397*** -0.129 2.187*** 0.881 
  (0.154) (0.379) (0.672) (2.149) 
𝛿0 𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡−1 0.001 0.025 0.046 -0.025 
  (0.013) (0.034) (0.055) (0.139) 
𝛿1 𝛥𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡 0.055** 0.233* 0.161* 0.749 
  (0.025) (0.125) (0.094) (0.628) 
𝛼1 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.103** 0.040 0.032 0.754 
  (0.052) (0.126) (0.287) (0.834) 
𝛼2 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.006 0.005 -0.190** -0.167 
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.095) (0.185) 
𝛽1 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.029 0.101 0.060 -0.159 
  (0.046) (0.078) (0.169) (0.545) 
𝛽2 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.449 -0.773 -1.830 11.128 
  (0.461) (1.570) (2.966) (9.582) 
𝛾1 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.646*** 0.485* 1.878* 0.765 
  (0.227) (0.273) (1.170) (1.795) 
𝛾2 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.690** 0.234 0.678 -0.665 
  (0.327) (0.416) (1.407) (1.926) 
𝛼3 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.068 -0.057 -0.779 -0.132 
  (0.195) (0.039) (0.632) (0.233) 
𝛼4 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.041 -0.058 -0.428 -0.352 
  (0.468) (0.480) (1.363) (1.744) 
𝛽3 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.119 0.294 -0.002 0.260 
  (0.125) (0.192) (0.433) (1.443) 
𝛽4 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.083* 0.119 0.200 0.290 
  (0.050) (0.075) (0.223) (0.496) 
𝛾3 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.009 -0.020 -0.140 -0.030 
  (0.040) (0.015) (0.126) (0.113) 
𝛾4 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.021 0.054 -0.179 0.159 
  (0.038) (0.056) (0.144) (0.383) 
      
Obs.  564 1,120 419 1,020 
# countries  27 68 20 63 
      
Kleibergen-Paap p-value  0.627 0.944 0.676 0.958 
Sargan–Hansen p-value  0.749 0.462 0.551 0.743 
      
H0 (p-values)     
𝛼1 − 𝛼2 = 0 0.445 0.578 0.497 0.240 
𝛾1 − 𝛾2 = 0 0.886 0.756 0.733 0.926 
−𝛼1 − 𝛾1 = 0 0.110 0.131 0.684 0.293 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2 = 0 0.032 0.570 0.528 0.794 
      
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 














Table 5a: Estimation results for real per capita private consumption by geographical 
region, IV (Hamilton-based) – 1970-2018 
Dependent Variable Real Private consumption per capita 
 Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
 Region Latin America MENAP SSA Europe Asia 
𝜆 𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.243** -0.195* -0.677*** -0.116*** -0.291*** 
  (0.099) (0.102) (0.152) (0.032) (0.091) 
𝜔0 𝑌𝑡−1 -0.190 -0.162 0.716*** 0.011 0.367** 
  (0.191) (0.220) (0.182) (0.055) (0.148) 
𝜔1 𝛥𝑌𝑡  -0.397 -1.121* 0.345 0.575*** 1.082*** 
  (0.774) (0.598) (0.495) (0.161) (0.254) 
𝛿0 𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡−1 0.001 0.098 0.117 -0.024** 0.040 
  (0.090) (0.083) (0.115) (0.012) (0.052) 
𝛿1 𝛥𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡 0.398 -0.022 0.435* 0.034 0.196 
  (0.276) (0.266) (0.237) (0.033) (0.129) 
𝛼1 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.306 0.257** -0.121 0.144*** -0.146 
  (0.210) (0.126) (0.144) (0.048) (0.161) 
𝛼2 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.024 0.077 -0.061** -0.007 0.032 
  (0.047) (0.058) (0.024) (0.031) (0.052) 
𝛽1 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.106 0.110 0.024 -0.038 -0.005 
  (0.188) (0.076) (0.131) (0.046) (0.159) 
𝛽2 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 1.345 -1.019 0.202 0.018 -0.246 
  (1.018) (1.959) (1.040) (0.478) (0.794) 
𝛾1 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.506 0.576* -0.370 0.431** 0.122 
  (0.471) (0.302) (0.231) (0.202) (0.256) 
𝛾2 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.001 0.303 0.022 -0.375 -0.412 
  (0.834) (0.383) (0.304) (0.418) (0.560) 
𝛼3 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.062 0.134 -0.069*** -0.048 -0.076 
  (0.044) (0.088) (0.023) (0.136) (0.096) 
𝛼4 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.538 -0.026 -1.073 0.395 -0.138 
  (0.489) (0.345) (1.078) (0.336) (0.551) 
𝛽3 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.545 0.519** 0.331 -0.020 -0.220* 
  (0.516) (0.224) (0.220) (0.121) (0.123) 
𝛽4 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.206 0.270*** -0.222*** 0.135*** -0.002 
  (0.135) (0.099) (0.085) (0.051) (0.061) 
𝛾3 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.025 0.050 -0.052*** -0.016 -0.035 
  (0.035) (0.044) (0.016) (0.034) (0.042) 
𝛾4 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.206 0.109 0.126* -0.020 -0.065 
  (0.140) (0.079) (0.068) (0.043) (0.051) 
         
Obs.  354 190 237 582 149 
# countries  20 11 13 30 7 
       
Kleibergen-Paap p-value  0.986 0.730 0.977 0.667 0.637 
Sargan–Hansen p-value  0.955 0.919 0.600 0.974 0.150 
       
H0 (p-values)      
𝛼1 − 𝛼2 = 0 0.232 0.503 0.748 0.792 0.893 
𝛾1 − 𝛾2 = 0 0.448 0.689 0.311 0.224 0.758 
−𝛼1 − 𝛾1 = 0 0.023 0.014 0.252 0.064 0.058 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2 = 0 0.976 0.575 0.784 0.359 0.420 
       
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 
and time effects estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% 




















Table 5b: Estimation results for real per capita private investment by geographical 
region, IV (Hamilton-based) – 1970-2018 
Dependent Variable Real Private investment per capita 
 Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
 Region Latin America MENAP SSA Europe Asia 
𝜆 𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.265** -0.296*** -0.592*** -0.306*** -1.369*** 
  (0.111) (0.096) (0.145) (0.077) (0.360) 
𝜔0 𝑌𝑡−1 0.606 -0.461 -0.218 0.514 0.673 
  (0.553) (0.765) (0.628) (0.364) (0.647) 
𝜔1 𝛥𝑌𝑡  4.198* -0.261 -0.624 2.905*** 1.950 
  (2.223) (2.917) (2.308) (0.798) (2.801) 
𝛿0 𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡−1 -0.035 0.176 0.169 0.068 -0.288 
  (0.269) (0.270) (0.398) (0.068) (0.240) 
𝛿1 𝛥𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡 -0.634 0.147 2.466** 0.008 0.121 
  (0.836) (0.652) (1.064) (0.172) (0.610) 
𝛼1 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.439 0.436 0.071 0.047 1.002 
  (0.453) (0.480) (0.744) (0.311) (1.095) 
𝛼2 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.055 0.185 -0.053 -0.339 -0.278 
  (0.113) (0.157) (0.351) (0.247) (0.385) 
𝛽1 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.156 0.263 0.551 -0.016 -0.201 
  (0.483) (0.259) (0.788) (0.258) (0.722) 
𝛽2 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -2.039 -2.130 0.391 -4.705 2.988 
  (1.672) (4.743) (4.761) (3.406) (3.141) 
𝛾1 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -1.170 0.532 0.827 1.046 3.846** 
  (1.172) (1.093) (2.281) (1.118) (1.577) 
𝛾2 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.208 0.068 0.636 2.515 -0.642 
  (2.104) (0.970) (2.421) (1.831) (1.619) 
𝛼3 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.056 0.289 0.131 0.380 0.862 
  (0.101) (0.296) (0.457) (0.762) (0.921) 
𝛼4 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.362 -1.032 -5.509 -0.452 -2.525 
  (1.664) (0.975) (6.381) (2.085) (2.821) 
𝛽3 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -1.314 1.324 -0.274 -0.153 0.380 
  (1.387) (1.036) (1.461) (0.548) (1.776) 
𝛽4 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.482 0.338 -0.190 0.034 0.232 
  (0.316) (0.389) (0.827) (0.295) (0.652) 
𝛾3 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.049 0.176 0.105 -0.127 0.093 
  (0.081) (0.142) (0.346) (0.185) (0.324) 
𝛾4 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.131 0.312 0.709 -0.232 0.137 
  (0.381) (0.306) (0.495) (0.214) (0.322) 
         
Obs.  342 190 224 418 130 
# countries  19 11 13 22 6 
       
Kleibergen-Paap p-value  0.979 0.734 1.000 0.406 0.438 
Sargan–Hansen p-value  0.870 0.880 0.145 0.842 0.708 
       
H0 (p-values)      
𝛼1 − 𝛼2 = 0 0.255 0.587 0.944 0.146 0.427 
𝛾1 − 𝛾2 = 0 0.776 0.190 0.360 0.846 0.302 
−𝛼1 − 𝛾1 = 0 0.206 0.299 0.219 0.932 0.202 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2 = 0 0.942 0.904 0.795 0.103 0.815 
       
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 
and time effects estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% 
levels. Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (MENAP), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
 
4.3.2. Composition of Fiscal Consolidations  
Regarding the composition of the fiscal episode, we also assessed if the effects differ 
due to the fact that a consolidation is more based on the spending side or on the revenue (tax) 
side of the budget. From Table 6 (columns 3 and 4) we can detect that a consolidation more on 
the spending side, via final government consumption, promotes higher private investment, 
while that is not the case for the consolidations on the revenue side. Additionally, that effect on 
private investment has a higher magnitude for the case where a spending based consolidation 




Table 6: Estimation results for real per capita private consumption and investment, 
spending vs. tax-based consolidations, IV (Hamilton-based) – 1970-2018 
 
Dependent Variable Real Private consumption per 
capita 
Real Private Investment per 
capita 
 Specification 1 2 3 4 
  Hamilton-based Hamilton-based 
 Consolidation 
Composition 
Spending-based Tax-based Spending-based Tax-based 
𝜆 𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.265*** -0.272*** -0.317*** -0.331*** 
  (0.023) (0.049) (0.033) (0.068) 
𝜔0 𝑌𝑡−1 0.166** 0.073 -0.481 0.616 
  (0.071) (0.111) (0.374) (0.474) 
𝜔1 𝛥𝑌𝑡 0.582** 0.047 0.397 2.954* 
  (0.237) (0.343) (1.150) (1.592) 
𝛿0 𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡−1 0.012 -0.001 0.094 -0.066 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.123) (0.104) 
𝛿1 𝛥𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡 0.188** 0.138* 1.071** 0.481 
  (0.083) (0.071) (0.427) (0.425) 
𝛼1 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.054 0.070 1.035** -0.407 
  (0.084) (0.071) (0.489) (0.359) 
𝛼2 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.148** 0.117* 0.816** -0.434 
  (0.063) (0.069) (0.396) (0.337) 
𝛽1 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.003 0.003 -0.273* -0.019 
  (0.028) (0.017) (0.161) (0.109) 
𝛽2 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.024** -0.018 -0.131 0.029 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.104) (0.091) 
𝛾1 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.011 0.072 -0.120 0.086 
  (0.053) (0.049) (0.259) (0.265) 
𝛾2 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.060 0.047 -0.019 0.080 
  (0.045) (0.046) (0.216) (0.221) 
𝛼3 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -1.403 -0.165 6.692 1.202 
  (1.019) (0.643) (4.571) (2.751) 
𝛼4 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.591** 0.436 3.393** -1.126 
  (0.245) (0.295) (1.427) (1.447) 
𝛽3 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.175 0.254 -0.048 -1.738 
  (0.240) (0.608) (1.102) (2.564) 
𝛽4 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.069** -0.053* -0.352* -0.009 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.210) (0.152) 
𝛾3 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.003 0.184 -1.739 -2.487 
  (0.673) (0.471) (2.973) (1.939) 
𝛾4 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.158 0.225 -0.059 -0.343 
  (0.151) (0.169) (0.713) (1.047) 
      
Obs.  1,684 1684 1,439 1439 
# countries  60 96 50 84 
      
Kleibergen-Paap p-
value 
 0.22 0.68 0.45 0.70 
Sargan–Hansen p-value  0.05 0.64 0.28 0.54 
      
H0 (p-values)     
𝛼1 − 𝛼2 = 0 0.131 0.707 0.188 0.557 
𝛾1 − 𝛾2 = 0 0.989 0.813 0.593 0.201 
−𝛼1 − 𝛾1 = 0 0.335 0.088 0.021 0.404 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2 = 0 0.461 0.679 0.833 0.505 
      
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 
and time effects estimated but omitted for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% 
levels.  
 
4.3.3. Debt thresholds 
 The effects of government spending on private consumption may depend on the level of 
government indebtedness. That is, the effects of government spending could become less 
Keynesian if large increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio occur or if these are already at relatively 
high levels as policy options are constrained and governments have less room for manoeuvre. 
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In order to assess how different levels of government indebtedness affect the responsiveness of 
private consumption and investment, we consider a threshold for the debt ratio using a dummy 
variable highdebt defined as follows: highdebtit takes the value 1 if the debt ratio is above the 
average of the debt ratio in year t for the respective income group sample, and 0 otherwise, 
represented by lowdebt (effectively it corresponds to 1-highdebt). 
 Results are shown in Table 7. We observe that the increase in government expenditure is 
positively associated with real private consumption in both advanced and developing 
economies irrespective of the indebtedness level. However, advanced economies with low 
government debt witness a larger reduction in private consumption from an increase in 
government spending when fiscal consolidations are not occurring.  
 Social transfers only affect real private consumption per capita in the case of developing 
economies: increasing social transfers has a negative toll on consumption independently of 
public indebtedness levels and of the occurrence, or not, of fiscal consolidations. Tax increases 
positively affect consumption per capita, exhibiting Ricardian behaviour mainly in highly 
indebted countries. 
 Regarding the effects of fiscal variables on private investment, an increase in government 
final consumption reduces real per capita private investment in advanced economies with lower 
debt levels and not experiencing a fiscal contraction. The opposite effect is found for social 
transfers, where higher levels are of this fiscal variable are associated with higher investment 
levels, only for lower debt developing economies. Lastly, an expansionary fiscal consolidation 
occurs with the increase of tax revenues in advanced economies facing higher debt levels and 



















Table 7: Estimation results for real per capita private consumption and investment, high 
and low public debt, IV (Hamilton-based) – 1970-2018 
 
Dependent Variable Real Private consumption per capita Real Private investment per capita 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
Income Group AE DEV AE DEV 
𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.073** -0.287*** -0.236*** -0.288*** 
 (0.033) (0.047) (0.050) (0.067) 
𝑌𝑡−1 -0.028 0.186* 0.329* -0.132 
 (0.048) (0.096) (0.172) (0.324) 
𝛥𝑌𝑡  0.273** 0.458 1.588*** 0.151 
 (0.126) (0.297) (0.306) (1.116) 
𝑌𝑎𝑣𝑡−1 -0.003 -0.012 0.035 -0.136 
 (0.015) (0.034) (0.058) (0.168) 
𝛥𝑌𝑎𝑣𝑡 0.045* 0.276** 0.105 0.603 
 (0.026) (0.116) (0.078) (0.473) 
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.148*** 0.055 0.308 -0.346 
 (0.053) (0.114) (0.366) (0.488) 
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.100 0.052 0.024 -0.376 
 (0.065) (0.094) (0.273) (0.323) 
FC𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × 𝑙ow𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.081* 0.114** 0.086 -0.097 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.149) (0.242) 
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.032 -0.007 -0.157* 0.399 
 (0.024) (0.049) (0.083) (0.339) 
𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.027 0.026 -0.104 0.009 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.092) (0.123) 
𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.006 -0.027* -0.087 0.028 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.079) (0.124) 
𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.048 0.031 -0.168 0.153 
 (0.040) (0.109) (0.371) (0.560) 
𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.000 0.004 0.054 0.659** 
 (0.046) (0.063) (0.218) (0.308) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.000 -0.005 -0.033 0.414* 
 (0.041) (0.048) (0.103) (0.230) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.836 -0.072 -0.841 4.137 
 (0.627) (0.886) (1.773) (4.013) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.247 0.312 2.688 -2.450 
 (1.255) (0.703) (5.195) (4.311) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.593* -0.094 1.702* 0.499 
 (0.338) (0.299) (0.955) (1.327) 
𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.524** 0.538** 0.967 -0.656 
 (0.231) (0.225) (0.883) (0.893) 
𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.793* -0.114 0.975 -1.234 
 (0.483) (0.202) (0.971) (1.038) 
𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.331 -0.026 -2.329 -1.404 
 (0.599) (0.580) (1.901) (3.088) 
𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.060 -0.083 -0.512 0.069 
 (0.248) (0.054) (0.748) (0.271) 
𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.046 -0.046* -0.574 -0.124 
 (0.111) (0.027) (0.384) (0.138) 
𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.094 -0.284 1.328 -0.424 
 (0.439) (0.488) (1.731) (2.109) 
𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.167 0.015 0.849 0.533 
 (0.455) (0.377) (1.514) (1.691) 
𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.178 0.118 0.310 0.826 
 (0.197) (0.181) (0.395) (1.079) 
𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.174* -0.053 0.582*** 1.120 
 (0.103) (0.193) (0.215) (0.828) 
𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.076* 0.109** 0.159 -0.101 
 (0.046) (0.055) (0.137) (0.219) 
𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 -0.009 -0.016 -0.136 0.031 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.089) (0.096) 
𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 0.010 -0.002 -0.060 0.393* 
 (0.032) (0.048) (0.114) (0.221) 
     
Obs. 564 1,120 419 1,020 
# countries 27 68 20 63 
     
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0.998 0.938 0.971 0.808 
Sargan–Hansen p-value 0.411 0.336 0.538 0.941 
     
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 








4.3.4. Financial Crises 
The influence of financial crises is likely to play a role when austerity and fiscal 
consolidations are being designed and implemented. While financial crises were not abundant 
in OECD countries prior to 2008 (although some significant crises took place in countries as 
Spain, the US, Finland, or Sweden before the “Great Recession”) there are enough cases to 
consider. In what follows, we rely on Laeven and Valencia (2013, 2018) database (which was 
recently updated and is publicly available) to assess whether the link between fiscal 
consolidations and private consumption and investment is different during such crises episodes. 
These episodes include precise dating for (systemic) banking crises, currency crises, debt crises 
and sovereign debt restructurings. Under an impaired credit channel (near to) zero-bound 
monetary policy (in more recent years) the link between these variables is likely to differ and 
this is a hypothesis worth investigating. From a policy perspective a relevant message can be 
extracted such as the need to prop up the financial sector to restore confidence and the 
channelling of savings to private investment thus favouring a non-Keynesian outcome of fiscal 
consolidations. Using a specification similar to the one in the previous section for the case of 
debt thresholds and by means of a dummy variable (crisis) for financial crises, we obtain the 
estimates in Table 7. 
The results in Table 8 show that when there are no crises, the increase of government 
spending (taxation), in the presence of fiscal consolidations (in the absence of fiscal 
consolidations), increase real private consumption per capita in advanced economies. An 
increase in tax and government spending levels positively affects real per capita consumption 
when a consolidation is taking place but there was no financial crisis. The opposite effect is 
verified when an economy sees itself in a situation where it is experiencing, at a same time, a 
financial crisis and does not consolidate. Regarding the fiscal impact over real private 
investment, both government spending (during a crisis) and taxes (without experiencing a 
financial crisis) positively affects investment during a fiscal consolidation episode. The increase 
in the overall tax burden in a non-crisis period and in the absence of consolidation negatively 
impacts private investment, while the rise in social transfers during a financial crisis 








Table 8: Estimation results for real per capita private consumption and investment, 
financial crises, IV (Hamilton-based) – 1970-2018 
 
Dependent Variable Real Private consumption per capita Real Private investment per capita 
Specification 1 2 3 4 
Income Group AE DEV AE DEV 
𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.060 -0.262*** -0.220*** -0.327*** 
 (0.038) (0.049) (0.063) (0.071) 
𝑌𝑡−1 -0.015 0.063 0.260 -0.041 
 (0.057) (0.086) (0.208) (0.462) 
𝛥𝑌𝑡  0.426** -0.040 2.221*** 1.031 
 (0.195) (0.296) (0.519) (1.690) 
𝑌𝑎𝑣𝑡−1 -0.017 0.018 0.092 -0.028 
 (0.014) (0.034) (0.063) (0.129) 
𝛥𝑌𝑎𝑣𝑡 0.042* 0.203 0.189* 0.415 
 (0.024) (0.187) (0.107) (0.806) 
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.331 1.525 -0.120 19.567 
 (0.341) (2.611) (0.222) (19.811) 
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.088* 0.095 0.279 0.570 
 (0.051) (0.103) (0.329) (0.561) 
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.210 0.137 -0.202 0.141 
 (0.234) (0.116) (0.675) (0.558) 
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.273 0.196  -0.739 
 (0.332) (0.412)  (2.579) 
𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.011 0.007 -0.156 -0.109 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.100) (0.143) 
𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.316 -0.066 0.116 -0.185 
 (0.244) (0.078) (1.165) (0.370) 
𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  -1.861  -18.807 
  (2.916)  (18.835) 
𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.033 0.023 -0.140 -0.234 
 (0.047) (0.100) (0.268) (0.489) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.174 0.060 0.147 0.219 
 (0.277) (0.054) (1.123) (0.288) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  0.907  23.248 
  (3.651)  (22.260) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.613 -0.167 -0.873 6.766 
 (0.403) (0.918) (1.648) (4.798) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 5.652** 1.328 5.911 6.183 
 (2.692) (1.398) (7.426) (7.688) 
𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.268 0.436** 2.814*** 0.262 
 (0.213) (0.203) (0.895) (1.138) 
𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  0.232  -11.531 
  (1.345)  (23.510) 
𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.793** -0.043 1.254 -0.692 
 (0.384) (0.118) (1.540) (0.828) 
𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -3.257 0.356 -0.201 2.192 
 (2.490) (0.377) (14.925) (2.328) 
𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.157 -0.075* -0.956** -0.215 
 (0.118) (0.039) (0.414) (0.212) 
𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  -2.942  19.812 
  (2.756)  (55.900) 
𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.102 0.376 -0.893 0.788 
 (0.358) (0.372) (1.650) (1.542) 
𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.045 0.123 1.052 -2.886 
 (0.765) (0.953) (6.375) (4.167) 
𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.100 0.236 -0.294 0.181 
 (0.115) (0.167) (0.418) (0.890) 
𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.051 0.113** 0.349** 0.105 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.175) (0.285) 
𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) × 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.009 -0.026* -0.081 -0.046 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.105) (0.100) 
𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚)  × 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 -0.010 0.044 -0.296** 0.151 
 (0.034) (0.053) (0.139) (0.258) 
     
Obs. 564 1,120 419 1,020 
# countries 27 68 20 63 
     
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0.995 1.000 0.986 1.000 
Sargan–Hansen p-value 0.911 0.744 0.957 0.944 
     
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 






5. Conclusion and Policy Implications´ 
 
We have assessed in a panel framework, for an unbalanced sample of 174 countries 
between 1970-2018 (37 advanced and 137 developing economies), whether a usually expected 
negative response of private consumption and private investment to a fiscal consolidation is 
reversed. We have employed three alternative measures of the Cyclically Adjusted Primary 
Balance to determine the so-called fiscal episodes: i) sourced from the WEO based; ii) HP-
based; and iii) Hamilton-based.  
Our main results can be summarised as follows: i) increases in general government final 
consumption expenditure have a positive (Keynesian) effect on real per capita private 
consumption; : ii) there is a positive effect of tax increases on private consumption when there 
is a fiscal consolidation; iii) there is a crowding-in effect for private investment, from fiscal 
contractions. In addition, these effects are the strongest in advanced economies vis-à-vis 
developing countries (notably for the Hamilton-based fiscal consolidations). Expansionary 
fiscal consolidations occur particularly in highly indebted advanced economies following an 
increase in taxes. Finally, the negative effect of taxation on private consumption is larger when 
an economy is experiencing a financial crisis but it is not consolidating.  
On the basis of our findings, it is relevant to consider that a fiscal retrenchment can in 
some cases contribute to an increase in domestic demand via private investment, a channel that 
should not be disregarded, notably if it implies lower tax rates. Regarding the level of 
government indebtedness, advanced economies with low government debt ratios endure a 
larger reduction in private consumption after increases in government spending and when fiscal 
consolidations are not occurring. In that sense, consumers in low debt countries would behave 
in a less profligate fashion when the government does not consolidate. Therefore, we present, 
in a general and summarized way, the results obtained in Table 9. 
Possible future work could try to disentangle between countries that at some point 
appear to be more pressed for implementing fiscal austerity than others, which might imply 




Table 9: Summary results 
  Real per capita consumption 
  
Baseline 
 Income Group  Source of fiscal policy consolidation 
   AE  DEV  Spending-based  Tax-based 
  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol. 
FCE  + +  + 0  0 0  + 0  + 0 
TF  0 0  + 0  0 0  0 -  0 - 
TAX  - 0  + -  + 0  0 0  0 0 
  Geographical Group 
  Latin America  MENAP  SSA  Europe  Asia 
  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol. 
FCE  0 0  + 0  - -  + 0  0 0 
TF  0 0  + +  0 0  0 +  - 0 
TAX  0 0  + 0  - +  + 0  0 0 
  Real per capita investment 
  
Baseline 
 Income Group  Source of fiscal policy consolidation 
   AE  DEV  Tax-based  Spending-based 
  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol.  Consol. Not Consol. 
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FCE  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
TF  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
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Table A1. Summary statistics of fiscal Consolidations based on the change in the CAPB, 
WEO, HP-based and Hamilton-based, full sample, and per criterion of economic 
development. 
Full Sample 
   Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max.  p1  p99  Skewness  Kurtosis Obs. 
WEO-based 1.828 1.42 0.509 10.944 0.519 7.731 2.632 13.137 225 
HP-based 6.219 33.648 -4.341 554.058 -0.017 49.466 13.59 198.826 672 
Hamilton-based 6.701 35.095 -55.358 569.693 -0.047 90.787 12.791 181.82 669 
Advanced Economies 
   Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max.  p1  p99  Skewness  Kurtosis Obs. 
WEO-based 1.592 1.07 0.513 5.759 0.519 5.508 1.769 6.291 122 
HP-based 1.617 1.42 0.132 10.653 0.14 7.318 2.893 14.52 169 
Hamilton-based 1.523 1.188 0.17 8.047 0.356 6.089 2.366 10.072 171 
Developing Economies 
   Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max.  p1  p99  Skewness  Kurtosis Obs. 
WEO-based 2.107 1.709 0.509 10.944 0.551 8.39 2.504 11.079 103 
HP-based 7.766 38.771 -4.341 554.058 -0.023 71.336 11.758 148.963 503 




Table A2. Estimation results for real per capita private investment controlled for real 
interest rate, IV – 1970-2018, all sample 
 
Dependent Variable Real Private Investment per capita 
 Specification 1 2 3 
  WEO-based HP-Based Hamilton-
based 
𝜆 𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.169 -0.310*** -0.314*** 
  (0.114) (0.063) (0.071) 
𝜔0 𝑌𝑡−1 -0.400 -0.540 -0.186 
  (0.463) (0.498) (0.533) 
𝜔1 𝛥𝑌𝑡  0.332 -0.802 0.350 
  (1.587) (1.489) (1.529) 
𝛿0 𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡−1 -0.073 0.166 0.197 
  (0.084) (0.116) (0.137) 
𝛿1 𝛥𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡 0.205 0.587 0.234 
  (0.386) (0.456) (0.515) 
𝛿2 𝑟𝑡 0.003 0.001 0.006 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
𝛼1 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.260 0.085 0.045 
  (0.244) (0.365) (0.428) 
𝛼2 𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.078 -0.056 -0.070 
  (0.087) (0.104) (0.098) 
𝛽1 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.907*** 0.466* 0.197 
  (0.338) (0.280) (0.268) 
𝛽2 𝑇𝐹𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.742 0.742 3.439 
  (1.147) (3.447) (4.148) 
𝛾1 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.488 0.480 -1.205 
  (0.876) (1.356) (1.627) 
𝛾2 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -1.058 0.303 -1.908 
  (1.645) (1.996) (3.093) 
𝛼3 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.018 -0.066 -0.028 
  (0.084) (0.142) (0.128) 
𝛼4 𝛥𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 1.390 0.154 0.448 
  (1.737) (1.422) (1.471) 
𝛽3 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 1.676* 1.467* 1.364 
  (0.962) (0.911) (1.011) 
𝛽4 𝛥𝑇𝐹𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.158 0.120 -0.180 
  (0.203) (0.347) (0.375) 
𝛾3 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.046 -0.032 -0.051 
  (0.066) (0.079) (0.068) 
𝛾4 𝛥𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.846** 0.411* 0.406 
  (0.374) (0.229) (0.263) 
     
Obs.  527 964 958 
# countries  36 62 62 
     
Kleibergen-Paap p-value  0.557 0.936 0.872 
Sargan–Hansen p-value  0.579 0.775 0.821 
     
H0 (p-values)    
𝛼1 − 𝛼2 = 0 0.653 0.837 0.383 
𝛾1 − 𝛾2 = 0 0.773 0.839 0.867 
−𝛼1 − 𝛾1 = 0 0.121 0.225 0.593 
𝛽1 − 𝛽2 = 0 0.492 0.855 0.553 
     
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 






Table A3. Estimation results for real per capita private consumption and investment, by 
type of tax, IV (Hamilton-based) – 1970-2018 
Dependent Variable Real Private consumption per capita Real Private investment per capita 
 Specification 1 2 3 4 
 Income Group AE DEV AE DEV 
𝜆 𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑡−1 -0.116*** -0.534*** -0.020 -0.339*** 
  (0.028) (0.126) (0.085) (0.107) 
𝜔0 𝑌𝑡−1 0.049 0.499*** -0.404 0.337* 
  (0.031) (0.137) (0.356) (0.209) 
𝜔1 𝛥𝑌𝑡  0.296** 0.388 -0.091 2.496*** 
  (0.139) (0.266) (1.095) (0.523) 
𝛿0 𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡−1 -0.034*** -0.042 -0.063 -0.042 
  (0.010) (0.060) (0.073) (0.137) 
𝛿1 𝛥𝑌
𝑎𝑣
𝑡 0.015 -0.078 -0.224* 0.150 
  (0.023) (0.122) (0.115) (0.229) 
𝛼1 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.002 -0.021 0.042 0.034 
  (0.017) (0.068) (0.156) (0.119) 
𝛼2 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.049* 0.055 0.316* 0.015 
  (0.027) (0.057) (0.188) (0.099) 
𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 -0.005 -0.008 0.273 -0.019 
  (0.007) (0.021) (0.199) (0.041) 
𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.026 -0.128 1.068 -0.021 
  (0.137) (0.477) (1.321) (0.801) 
𝛾1 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.064 -0.099 0.516 -0.128 
  (0.083) (0.167) (0.681) (0.312) 
𝛾2 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.777*** 0.265 1.713 -0.100 
  (0.291) (0.317) (1.633) (0.709) 
𝛼3 𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.206 0.363** 1.980** 0.151 
  (0.161) (0.172) (0.996) (0.330) 
𝛼4 𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.015 -0.077 -0.162 -0.035 
  (0.014) (0.214) (1.489) (0.390) 
𝛽3 𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.002 -0.005 1.836** -0.015 
  (0.014) (0.043) (0.795) (0.071) 
𝛽4 𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) 0.010 -0.039 0.035 0.031 
  (0.017) (0.044) (0.156) (0.088) 
𝛾3 𝛥𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 × 𝐹𝐶
𝑚 0.038 0.078 0.274 0.023 
  (0.027) (0.062) (0.197) (0.103) 
𝛾4 𝛥𝑆𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 × (1 − 𝐹𝐶
𝑚) -0.008 -0.011 0.316* -0.019 
  (0.005) (0.023) (0.173) (0.039) 
      
Obs.  600 733 441 697 
R2  0.584 0.160 0.002 0.387 
# countries  29 62 22 59 
      
Kleibergen-Paap p-value  0.934 0.996 0.793 0.993 
Sargan–Hansen p-value  0.153 0.248 0.441 0.304 
      
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis. Constant term and country 




Table A4. Unit-root tests 
Variable 
Constant Constant and Linear Trend 
Level 1st Difference Level 1st Difference 
lprivconspc -5.178*** -60.638*** -3.023*** -59.158*** 
lprivinvpc -6.879*** -63.252*** -17.375*** -56.734*** 
lrgdppc  -1.135 -43.601*** -1.113 -42.269*** 
lrpubconspc -10.526*** -62.684*** -7.354*** -60.571*** 
lrtaxespc -1.951** -42.511*** -4.769*** -35.524*** 










Figure A1: Changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance by income group: 1970-
2018 
 
WEO-based CAPB HP-based CAPB Hamilton-based CAPB  
Advanced Economies 
   
Developing Economies 
   
Note: CAPB expressed in percent of potential GDP. Top and bottom 1% of the change in the respective CAPB 
dropped to remove serious outliers. HP-based CAPB and Hamilton-based CAPB distributions constrained – for 
comparison purposes – to map the same country-time coverage as the one available for the WEO CAPB. 
 
 
Figure A2: Initial fiscal imbalances and subsequent adjustment by income group: 1970-
2018, WEO-based CAPB 
  
  
Note: budget position measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of potential GDP). “improvement” 

























































































Figure A3: Strength and duration of consolidation episodes, by income group: 1970-




   
Note: budget position measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of potential GDP). “improvement” 




Figure A4: Relationship between duration and size of consolidation: 1970-2018, by 
income group, WEO-based CAPB 
  
Note: budget position measured by the cyclically adjusted primary balance (% of potential GDP). “improvement” 






Figure A5: Overview of Selected Fiscal and Macroeconomic Indicators around 
consolidation episodes, advanced economies  
CAPB (% GDP) Debt (% GDP) 
  
Real GDP growth (%) Inflation rate (%) 
  
Note: “t” corresponds to the first year of the consolidation episode. Horizontal axis in years. Consolidations 
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Figure A6: Overview of Selected Fiscal and Macroeconomic Indicators around 
consolidation episodes, developing economies  
CAPB (% GDP) Debt (% GDP) 
  
Real GDP growth (%) Inflation rate (%) 
  
Note: “t” corresponds to the first year of the consolidation episode. Horizontal axis in years. Consolidations 
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